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In  foreign  policy,  role  transition  as  a  process  of  role  change  implies  at  least  two  roles  (a  
state'ʹs  old  role  and  its  new  role)  and  a  dynamic  process  of  role  location  in  which  Ego’s  
role  changes  over  time.  If  every  role  for  Ego  presumes  a  counter-­‐‑role  for  Alter,  a  pattern  
of  role  transition  for  Ego  implies  as  well  a  potential  process  of  role  transition  for  Alter.  
In  order  to  model  the  process  of  role  transition,  a  taxonomy  of  mutually  exclusive  and  
logically  exhaustive  roles  and  counter-­‐‑roles  is  desirable,  in  order  to  identify  and  specify  
the  possible  combinations  of  old  and  new  roles  as  patterns  of  role  transition.  Binary  role  
theory  provides  a  taxonomy  that  meets  these  criteria  and  is  employed  in  this  paper  to  
model  the  process  of  role  transition  as  a  transition  in  Grand  Strategy  Orientations.  The  
binary  model  is  complete  in  a  way  that  three-­‐‑way  (or  multi-­‐‑way)  models  cannot  be.  
Several  hypotheses  about  the  role  of  domestic  politics  in  foreign  policy  role  transitions,  
however,  suggest  the  conditions  under  which  unstable  triads  may  become  provisionally  
stable.  Application  of  the  resulting  model  to  selected  episodes  of  role  transition  in  
triadic  relations  among  China,  the  Soviet  Union,  the  United  States,  Japan,  and  South  
Korea  illustrates  the  model’s  potential  descriptive  and  explanatory  power  for  analyzing  
strategic  triads  and  the  contours  of  a  research  program  for  understanding  foreign  policy  
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Introduction 
 One of the inherent tensions within the realist approach to international relations 
theory is its ambivalence about variations in state responses to the same international 
environment. Realists in general, and neorealists in particular, anticipate that states will 
respond to the same structural constraints in more or less the same way. Realists argue 
that states are driven by some fundamental concern. This "fundamentalism" is perhaps 
more characteristic of realism, in fact, than is agreement about what the fundamental 
objective of states is. Several such objectives have been proposed: power (Morgenthau 
1948), survival (Waltz 1979), threat reduction (Walt 1987), hegemony (Mearsheimer 
2001), and so on. These objectives are conceptually related, and perhaps it might be said 
that all realists take survival to be the ultimate goal of states at some level of abstraction. 
Yet it seems equally clear that some other singular, intermediate goal figures 
prominently in many examples of realist theorizing. Disagreements about this goal have 
animated a series of debates among realists: between Hans Morgenthau and Henry 
Kissinger as realism rose to intellectual prominence in the United States, between 
conservative realists and neoconservatives in US foreign policy more recently, and 
between offensive and defensive realists within academia (see Zimmer 2011; Muravchik 
and Walt 2008; Snyder 2002). 
 The tension in realism is enhanced by the common disavowal that structural 
realism is a theory of foreign policy. Presumably, states that want the same thing and 
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that occupy the same structural position will behave in the same way. There is no 
obvious impediment to crafting a structural theory of foreign policy on this basis other 
than the healthy and pragmatic acknowledgment that the predictive record of such a 
theory would not be good. One might fall back on the "long run."  In the long run Japan, 
for example, will be forced to pay more for its own defense. But a theory that specifies 
no time frame can scarcely be called a theory, and certainly not a falsifiable one. 
 One way that contemporary realism parts company with the classical realist 
tradition is in its commitment to a vision of states as isomorphic units. Another 
common realist formulation envisions the world as a zero-sum competition (Grieco 
1988). This understanding reinforces the fundamentalism noted above: all states are 
seen as competing for some (singular) good whose supply is finite so that one state's 
gain is, ipso facto, another state's loss. Yet although Morgenthau (1948) identified this 
good as power, he also rejected an isomorphic view of states, distinguishing between 
status quo and revisionist powers. Both want power, and yet they behave differently. In 
fact, the two states Morgenthau had in mind, the United States and the Soviet Union, 
both occupied similar, superpower positions in the international system. Later realists 
found it better to dispense with Morgenthau's distinction and to argue, instead, that the 
United States and the Soviet Union did behave in essentially the same way. 
 Leaving aside the question of whether these two states always behaved in the 
same way—we find it unsurprising that they often did, but do not believe that they 
always did—we propose to focus on the underlying problem. If states respond to the 
same constraints in different ways, the prospects for predictive theories of international 
relations are much diminished. One response within the field of foreign policy analysis 
has been to formalize distinctions among states, though not necessarily by embracing 
Morgenthau's binary typology. This approach has given rise to role theory (Holsti 1970; 
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Walker 1979, 1987), image theory (Cottam 1977; Herrmann 1985; Herrmann and 
Fischerkeller 1995), and most recently a welter of state identity theories (Hopf 2002; 
Katzenstein 1996; Neumann 1999; Ringmar 1996; Wendt 1994, 2004). 
 
Role Theory as a Theory of Symbolic and Strategic Interaction 
 
 Image and identity theories anticipate that different kinds of states do different 
sorts of things, even in response to the same external stimuli. Arguably, role theory 
takes this claim one step further by conceiving of identities in an intrinsically relational 
fashion, thus endogenizing at least one aspect of the external environment. Role emerges 
from the ongoing interaction of self and other, not merely from beliefs about (national) 
self-conception. By specifying the role relationships in which states can locate 
themselves, role theory specifies the kinds of behavior that are possible (or likely) under 
specific circumstances. 
 Role theory is thus a theory of uncertainty reduction (Walker, Malici, and Schafer 
2011) and, as such, a valuable complement to realist (particularly neoclassical realist) 
approaches. Roles make the social environment readily accessible by prescribing 
behavior according to agent type. Our brains are exceptionally good at identifying 
patterned behavior. Even infants as young as three months will stare longer at 
phenomena that are inconsistent with patterns they have already observed and with 
their rudimentary understanding of the physical world (Baillargeon 1994). Role theory 
is an expression of the same idea in the domain of international relations theory. States 
exhibit highly patterned interactions, and this reduces (though it does not eliminate) the 
uncertainty associated with predicting their behavior. 
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 Role theory interrogates the other from the perspective of self, and is thus most 
extensively developed as a phenomenon of binary relationships. Perhaps it would be 
more accurate to say role theories, since they range in the study of foreign policy from 
simple, inductively informed typologies such as Wendt's distinctions among friends, 
rivals, and enemies (each expressing a dyadic relationship, loosely informed by George 
Herbert Meade's symbolic interactionism) to better elaborated and more complex 
accounts that specify preferences, cue-taking, and responses to the other for a variety of 
dyad types (Walker, Malici, and Schafer 2011; cf. Stryker and Stratham 1985). 
 Clearly the web of social relationships, at all levels of aggregation, encompasses 
triads and more complex relationships as well. At the level of individuals, for example, 
niece and nephew, aunt and uncle are inherently triadic concepts. So, at the level of 
international relations, are roles such as mediator or even, though it is less obvious, loyal 
ally. An alliance may be a binary relationship. But to be loyal presumes the possibility of 
defection: that one may betray one's allegiance and give it to a third party instead.  
 Dyadic roles have been identified and specified both inductively (Holsti 1970; 
Walker 1987) and deductively (Singer and Hudson 1987; Thies 2013; Walker, Malici and 
Schafer 2011; Walker 2013). Holsti’s (1970) inventory of seventeen national role 
conceptions during the cold war inductively captures two dimensions of role 
enactment: active versus passive and cooperation versus conflict behavior in world 
politics. Taking a somewhat different tack, Thies identifies four master systemic roles in 
world politics—novice, small member, major member, and great power—based on a 
state's transition from lesser to greater power and status over time in the international 
system. He also points out that a state's level of activity and the variety of roles it adopts 
vary along a continuum of power (capabilities). The more powerful the state, the more 
active and varied its roles in world politics (Thies 2013).  
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 In addition to the master role specified by a state’s power position in the 
international system, Thies (2013) argues that a state acquires auxiliary roles toward 
other states in local and regional subsystems and at the global level of the international 
system. Walker (2013) identifies six auxiliary role identities: Client/Rebel for small 
members, Partner/Rival for major members, and Patron/Hegemon for great powers. 
These auxiliary roles represent ways of enacting the four families of Grand Strategy 
Orientations or GSOs—bandwagoning, appeasement, balancing, and hegemony—
specified by the distributions of capabilities and interests between two states that form a 
role dyad. The four families of GSOs are shown in Figure 1 and are differentiated by 
their respective highest-ranked preferences for a stable outcome in the relationship 
between self (Ego) and other (Alter). Hegemony is a strategy that ranks domination as 
the preferred outcome, balancing prefers an outcome of deadlock, appeasement prefers 
settlement, and bandwagoning prefers submission. There are six variants of each GSO, 
depending on the ordering of the other three (less preferred) outcomes. All variations 
are shown in Figure 1 and numbered, 1 through 24, for ease of reference. 
 Foreign and domestic role demands on the selection and enactment of grand 
strategies help to account for the preference orderings in the game variants associated 
with the enactment of each type of strategy.  Whether these role demands pertain to 
vital or secondary interests is shown on the left side of Figure 1. Role demands can act 
(and interact) as constraints on the role a state selects and on the variant a state selects 
as a role enactment strategy. The roles selected and enacted by Ego and Alter as 
members of a role dyad together construct the definition of the situation between them 
as an ordinal game of grand strategies with one or more equilibrium solutions. Role 
transition occurs in varying degrees when these roles change from those in the initial 
definition of the situation.   
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  Role        Client/Rebel      Partner/Rival     Patron/Hegemon  
  Demands           Identities           Identities           Identities  
  (Interests) 
  Bandwagoning Strategies 
   
   CO CF   CO CF   CO CF 
  CO 3 4  CO 2 4  CO 2 4  
  Secondary      #1         #2         #3   
   CF 1 2  CF 1 3  CF 3 1 
 
   CO CF   CO CF   CO CF 
  CO 3 4  CO 1 4  CO 1 4 
  Vital        #4         #5         #6   
  CF 2 1  CF 2 3  CF 3 2 
 
  Appeasement Strategies 
 
   CO CF   CO CF   CO CF 
  CO 4 3  CO 4 2  CO 4 2 
  Secondary       #7         #8         #9   
  CF 1 2  CF 1 3  CF 3 1 
 
   CO CF   CO CF   CO CF 
  CO 4 3  CO 4 1  CO 4 1 
  Vital      #10       #11        #12   
  CF 2 1  CF 2 3  CF 3 2 
 
  Balancing Strategies 
 
   CO CF   CO CF   CO CF 
  CO 2 3  CO 3 2  CO 1 2 
  Secondary      #13         #14        #15   
  CF 1 4  CF 1 4  CF 3 4 
 
   CO CF   CO CF   CO CF 
  CO 1 3  CO 3 1  CO 2 1 
  Vital       #16         #17        #18   
  CF 2 4  CF 2 4  CF 3 4 
 
  Hegemonic Strategies 
 
CO CF   CO CF   CO CF 
  CO 2 3  CO 3 2  CO 1 2 
  Secondary      #19         #20        #21   
  CF 4 1  CF 4 1  CF 4 3 
 
   CO CF   CO CF   CO CF 
  CO 1 3  CO 3 1  CO 2 1 
  Vital      #22        #23        #24   
  CF 4 2  CF 4 2  CF 4 3 
 
Weaker   Equal    Stronger 
 
Figure 1. Taxonomy of Grand Strategy Orientations for Ego’s Role Enactment  
Role Identities: Client/Rebel, Partner/Rival, Patron/Hegemon. Role Demands: Vital/Secondary 
Interests; Weaker/Equal/Stronger Power. Grand Strategies: Bandwagoning/Appeasement/ 
Balancing/Hegemonic Strategies. Role Enactments: CO = Cooperation; CF = Conflict. Outcomes are 
ranked as preferences from 4 (highest) to 1 (lowest). Grand Strategy Orientations (GSOs): #1-#24. 
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 The sources of role transition thus include: changes in role demands 
(power/interest distributions), changes in the role identities of cooperation (Client, 
Partner, Patron) or conflict (Rebel, Rival, Or Hegemon), and the cooperation (CO) or 
conflict (CF) role enactments exchanged as positive (+) or negative (–) cues between Ego 
and Alter as variants of bandwagoning, appeasement, balancing, and hegemonic Grand 
Strategy Orientations (Walker 2011, 2013; Walker and Marfleet 2013). The positive or 
negative cues represent information from each member of a role dyad regarding their 
expectations about the other member’s behavior and also communicate the resolve 
associated with those expectations. Each member interprets cues as the enactment of 
role identities in the context of the role demands specified by the distributions of power 
and interests between them. We will also develop an argument, in the next two sections, 
that the openness of domestic political systems to external information (see Hermann 
and Hermann 1989; Rokeach 1960; Rosenau 1966; Kowert and Hermann 1997; Kowert 
2002; Solingen 1998, 2007), and comparisons across domestic systems, can serve as 
another important source of cues for role enactment. The enactment of role identity is 
thus conditioned by foreign and domestic role demands, which together specify the 
receptivity of a state’s decision unit to external information. Decision units in closed 
(inward-looking) systems are less receptive to external information than open 
(outward-looking) systems and more prone to making decisions that are less responsive 
to external role demands and more responsive to domestic role demands (Solingen 
1998, 2007).1 This responsiveness very much depends on subjective judgments by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The application of this argument to the mechanisms of different kinds of decision units 
(predominant leader, single group, or multiple autonomous actors is modeled and 
tested in Hermann and Hermann (1989). 
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political leaders and not merely on structural aspects of the international power 
distribution or of domestic political systems. 
 Role-taking and role-making interactions among three states considered as a 
triad are more complex and potentially unstable than between pairs of states as dyads. 
Changes in the relations between two members of a triad can create pressures for 
change between the remaining pairs of states (Schweller 1998; Crawford 2003). As in 
physics, solutions to such three-body problems can be approximated inductively, which 
is the task that we undertake in this paper. Our approach is to understand the changes 
in roles between a pair of states (a dyad) by reference to changes in roles between each 
member of the dyad and a third state, which together with the pair constitute a triad of 
states.  
 Two possible general models are of particular interest to us. One is an externally 
driven source of role transition in which the role and counter-role constituting relations 
between two States A|B are disturbed by "perturbations" emanating from a third State 
C. The other is an internally-driven source of role transition in which domestic changes 
within a given State A alter the equilibrium of role and counter-role between A & B, 
which have perturbation effects on the other two role sets B|C and A|C leading to role 
transitions across the three role sets {A|B, A|C, B|C}. Perturbation	  analysis	  is	  a	  mathematical	  approach	  employed	  by	  classical	  and	  quantum	  physicists	  to	  achieve	  an	  improvement	  to	  an	  approximate	  solution	  for	  an	  unsolvable	  problem	  by	  starting	  with	  a	  problem	  that	  has	  a	  determinate	  mathematical	  solution,	  e.g.,	  a	  two-­‐body	  problem,	  and	  applying	  it	  to	  a	  three-­‐body	  problem	  by	  introducing	  the	  two-­‐body	  solution	  plus	  a	  new	  "perturbation"	  term	  that	  improves	  the	  initial	  approximate	  solution	  to	  the	  three-­‐body	  problem	  (Avrachenkov	  2013).	  In	  this	  paper	  the	  two-­‐body	  problem	  is	  a	  strategic	  dyad	  with	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a	  determinate	  solution	  to	  an	  ordinal	  game	  between	  Ego	  and	  Alter,	  which	  is	  employed	  along	  with	  a	  "perturbation"	  term	  (international	  or	  domestic)	  to	  improve	  the	  solution	  to	  the	  relatively	  indeterminate,	  three-­‐body	  problem	  posed	  by	  a	  strategic	  triad.2	  Although	  we	  do	  not	  formalize	  the	  perturbation	  analysis	  in	  this	  paper,	  we	  believe	  the	  concept	  offers	  a	  good	  approximation	  of	  the	  approach	  we	  take. 
 
A Proof of Concept Argument: The Sino-Soviet-American Triad 
 
 Consider the best-known and most widely studied international triad in recent 
memory: the unstable relationship between the United States, China, and the Soviet 
Union during the Cold War (Ashley 1980; Goldstein and Freeman 1990). In highly 
simplified and abstracted terms, their three-way Cold War relationship began with the 
US and the Soviet Union arrayed against each other as adversaries, and with China 
occupying an inferior position within the Soviet bloc. Even though the Chinese 
potential for returning to great power status that became manifest in the twenty-first 
century was mostly latent in the twentieth, it was nevertheless apparent as China 
became a nuclear power that its size and potential set it apart from almost all other 
states. 
 Let’s begin by considering only the US-Soviet relationship as a two-body 
problem. In general, their mutual enmity was overdetermined, but this is only one 
aspect of role taking. The enactment of this role, for example, might entail either 
cooperation or conflict. Consider their interaction in a crisis characterized by the game 
of chicken. With two Nash equilibria, and three nonmyopic equilibria (NME) defined 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See Goldstein and Freeman (1990: 67-84) and Brams’ (1994: 8-18, 183-206) for a general 
discussion of the problems created by the expansion from a 2 x 2 game to a larger game. 
	   10	  
by Brams (1994) Theory of Moves (TOM), the indeterminacy of the game is resolved 
within the TOM framework by applying two principles: (1) that the starting point of the 
game matters, and (2) that game play avoids endless cycling (Brams 1994: 130-138). 
Thus, if one player begins from an initially dominant position, and if the other player 
will not make a move that leads the game to cycle back to the starting position, then this 
starting position is a nonmyopic equilibrium point in a game of Chicken. Invoking the 
obvious historical analogy, once the United States was able to establish a position 
during the Cuban Missile Crisis that would lead only to further undesirable escalation 
(cycling) in the event of a Soviet challenge, Nikita Khrushchev sought a way to defuse 
the crisis, ending the impasse.3 
 In this two-player game—and, in fact, in all such two-player games—TOM 
indicates at least one NME.4  But this is not necessarily the case in a three-player game. 
The three-party game clearly began with China in the Soviet orbit. Yet even in the midst 
of war in Korea and later Vietnam, tensions in Sino-Soviet relations were apparent. 
These tensions came not only from their own territorial disputes, but also directly from 
their role relationship as the Soviets assumed the mantle of Communist leadership 
while China sought the role of partner and equal. Although Americans tended to view 
the Communist bloc as monolithic, Lüthi (2008) argues that Chinese and Soviet 
interpretations of Marxist ideology differed to such a great degree that they were 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Brams (1994: 133) holds that, "although this thinking may be more or less correct, there 
are good reasons to believe that U.S. policy makers viewed the game not to be Chicken 
at all, at least as far as they ranked the possible states."  He goes on to suggest another 
2x2 game as an alternative model of the Cuban missile crisis. 
 
4 A nonmyopic equilibrium is defined by Brams (1994: 224) as follows: "in a two-person 
game, a nonmyopic equilibrium is a state from which neither player, anticipating all 
possible rational moves and countermoves from the initial state, would have an 
incentive to depart unilaterally because the departure would eventually lead to a worse, 
or at least not a better, outcome." 
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themselves a source of deep tension in Sino-Soviet relations. For all of these reasons, the 
United States offered China in particular an enticing opportunity to seek concessions 
from both sides, particularly after the Brezhnev Doctrine and subsequent Soviet 
invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 rang alarm bells in Beijing (Rea 1975). 
 Richard Nixon and Mao Zedong's 1972 Shanghai Communiqué set the stage for 
China to pursue this strategy, culminating in the 1979 normalization of relations with 
the United States and the American withdrawal of diplomatic recognition from Taiwan. 
There were extensive domestic hurdles to overcome in both China and the US (see Ross 
1995), and these soon pushed China and the US further apart. Nevertheless, and despite 
the Soviet Union's own period of détente with the United States, the Soviet leadership 
was duly alarmed by the Sino-American overtures (see Su 1983).  As Goldstein and 
Freeman (1990) have argued more formally, this "three-way street" was inherently 
subject to destabilizing shocks. 
 While the "three-body problem" in physics does not have a set of determinate 
mathematical solutions for modeling the entire range of relations among three moving 
objects—e.g., the sun, the moon, and the earth—approximations are possible with 
different strategies. One is to reduce the three-body problem to a sequence or series of 
two-body problems, subsequently expanded to "perturbated" three-body problems. 
This approach informs the strategy we will employ in this paper. Another approach is 
to change the mathematics from the algebra and differential calculus employed in three-
body physics problems to rule-based, mathematical relationships such as the rules 
governing signed graph theory (Harary 1961, 1969). This reduction from interval to 
nominal binary levels of measurement permits a determinate set of mathematical 
solutions in the form of balanced triads as final states (equilibria) for three interacting 
states in world politics (Walker 2011; Walker and Malici 2011). Although we do not 
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formally apply this approach to identify triadic equilibrium states, we also employ 
signed graph theory as a helpful expedient.  
 The remainder of this paper proceeds within this conceptual framework, relying 
on the assumption that provisional equilibria are possible in three-body systems that 
approximate simplified, binary levels of measurement. These conditions may be 
affected by domestic politics as well as the international environment. In the following 
section, we offer several hypotheses about the perturbative conditions in domestic 
politics that create a suitable environment for NMEs to emerge in three-body systems at 




 Multiple lessons can be drawn from the example of the United States-China-
Soviet Union triangle. At a very general level, it serves as a potent illustration of the 
three-body problem in international relations. None of these three states could count on 
a stable and enduring alliance, or even close cooperation, with either of the other two 
during the Cold War. The state left out of an alliance of two is strongly motivated to 
offer incentives to one of the two allied states to "jump ship" and form a new alliance 
with it instead. This process can repeat itself indefinitely, and the Cold War showed 
some evidence of just this pattern. 
 One might counter that the US-China-Soviet Union triad was never so fluid as 
the above summary might suggest. The binary dynamics of East-West ideological 
confrontation meant that, however much Chinese and Soviet leaders might distrust one 
another, however much they might chafe at the competition for leadership of the 
communist world, and however severe their border disputes, neither could easily form 
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a real alliance with the United States. They could—and did—threaten rapprochement 
with the US for advantage in their dealings with each other, but neither could credibly 
abandon the communist bloc. Nor would domestic politics in the United States allow 
such an alliance without at least a fig leaf of progress toward democracy. In practice, 
therefore, a domestic politics of institutional and ideological compatibility restricted the 
range of possible alliance arrangements internationally.  
 Under great duress (as during World War II), such compunctions might be set 
aside, but such arrangements are very hard to sustain. This is the chief insight we wish 
to explore: provisionally stable solutions to three-body problems may emerge when 
either domestic or foreign political constraints reduce the degrees of freedom in a state's 
foreign policy. In the remainder of this paper, we will focus primarily on domestic 
constraints.  
 We hypothesize that domestic constraints may operate in several ways. First, as 
the above example suggests, incompatibility of domestic political institutions works 
against international alliance formation (cf. Kowert and Thies 2013). In particular, 
democracies will find it difficult to sustain close alliance relationships with non-
democracies (Gibler and Wolford 2006). 
H1 In multi-body systems, sustained alliances are unlikely among states with 
incompatible domestic political institutions. 
 
H2 In multi-body systems, sustained alliances are unlikely among states with 
deeply embedded but clashing socio-political ideologies. 
 
Institutional and ideological incompatibilities, as constraints on alliance behavior, are 
related both conceptually and empirically. From a Kantian perspective, one of the 
principle virtues of republican political systems is that they promote trust within a 
republican zone of peace (Doyle 1986).  
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Although democratic institutions may work on their own to constrain leaders, 
the Kantian interpretation—and the one supported by the preponderance of the 
literature on the democratic peace—is that it is their ideological similarity that creates a 
special relationship among democracies (Russett and Oneal 2001). This may constitute a 
positive inducement for cooperation. But for our purposes it is sufficient that it operates 
as a constraint on prejudicial foreign policies among democracies. 
 Even when there are no obvious incompatibilities among political institutions or 
ideologies, however, there is no guarantee of stable alliance arrangements. This is the 
three-body problem in its simplest form: the external (international) dynamics of a 
three-state system create an ongoing incentive to change alliance partners. When 
internal political coalitions themselves depend on support from an external partner, 
however, these incentives may be removed or reduced. So long as the Chinese civil war 
raged and the People's Liberation Army (PLA) received crucial support from the Soviet 
Union, there was little chance of Sino-American rapprochement. After the new People's 
Republic of China stabilized its borders and Mao consolidated his authority, however, 
the likelihood of conflict with the Soviet Union increased dramatically. 
H3 In multi-body systems, states whose dominant political coalitions are 
dependent on external alliance partners will be unlikely to abandon those 
partners. A shift toward inward-looking political coalitions will reduce the 
likelihood of stable external alliances 
 
Emerging from civil war, of course, the Communist Party of China (CPC) was 
not only institutionally dependent on Soviet support, but there was a clear imbalance in 
power and resources between the two countries. Yet even weaker partners in an 
international alliance can find ways to play on the fears of their patron state. Germany 
and Japan were both able to leverage American fears of any rapprochement with the 
Soviet Union, for example, and to establish a certain policy latitude as a result (see 
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Weber and Kowert 2007). Conversely, even when China began to pull away from the 
Soviet Union, it was not so much because its military capabilities had increased, but 
rather because the CPC had secured its position domestically.  
 In general, then, we anticipate that domestic politics can serve as a constraint, or 
in weaker cases as a brake, on international realignments among states. Conversely, 
releasing this brake may lead to instability and role transition. These dynamics can take 
two forms, impacting the relations between a pair of allies either directly or indirectly 
through the effects of changes within a third state on the relations of two other states. In 
advancing this claim, we are merely repeating arguments made by many other scholars.  
 However, this paper is an effort to apply such arguments more systematically to 
the three-body problem in international relations as one part of extending role theory 
by developing a general model of role-making and role-taking in international relations. 
To this end, we argue that several factors—notably the role of institutional politics 
among states and coalition politics within states—can serve to reduce the indeterminacy 
of the basic three-body problem and to permit a deeper understanding of role transition 
patterns among members of a dyadic or triadic role set. 
 
The US-Japan-South Korea Security Triangle 
 
 In the case of relations among the US, the PRC and the USSR, both domestic 
politics and ideology worked to simplify the instability of the relationship so that role 
transition in the form of rapprochement between the US and China could only go so far. 
Despite antagonisms between China and the Soviet Union, these constraints reinforced 
an East-West polarity. In short, domestic politics worked to simplify international role-
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taking and limit role transition. This case has suggested the superficial plausibility of 
our arguments and acts as a preliminary "proof of concept." 
 In the case of US-Japan-South Korea (ROK) relations, in contrast, domestic 
politics are increasingly working to complicate rather than to simplify role taking. 
Although this triad does not contradict our general argument—if features of domestic 
politics can serve to reduce uncertainty in international role taking, then they might also 
have the opposite effect, increasing uncertainty and destabilizing role relationships—
the US-Japan-ROK triad also illustrates the opposite effect of domestic politics on 
international role taking compared with the earlier story of the Sino-Soviet-American 
triad. As a matter of case selection, this is no accident. We are sensitive to the tendency 
of most case studies to consider only confirming cases (modus ponens). If certain 
domestic political arrangements may facilitate stability in international role taking, then 
the absence of those arrangements should lead to greater instability (modus tollens). The 
US-Japan-ROK triad, as it has evolved over the course of the late twentieth and early 
twenty-first century, is an example of the latter sort of case and, for this reason, a good 
test of our argument. 
 The remainder of this paper examines the three-way relationship among the 
United States, Japan, and South Korea (with additional reference to China) in the 
postwar era in order to probe the plausibility of the three hypotheses advanced in the 
previous section, and of H3 in particular. We will focus especially on inflection points in 
the history of this East Asian triad, moments when its internal role relationships were 
challenged in some fashion. We begin with the postwar establishment of these 
relationships in the context of war on the Korean peninsula and general US supremacy 
in East Asia. The economic rise of Japan in the 1970s and 1980s provided the next major 
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shock to these three-body systems. It was also toward the end of this period (the late 
1980s) that South Korean democratization began to lay the foundation for another 
change. As economic malaise took hold in Japan while Chinese and South Korean 
growth accelerated, we have entered a third phase of potential instability within this 
system. 
 
Period I. Early Postwar US Dominance 
 Historically, the roles adopted by the kingdoms and empires of East Asia were 
defined with respect to China as the region's dominant power. Where kingdoms and 
other forms of large-scale political organization arose, they mostly found it advisable to 
pay tribute to the Chinese core. If they had the power to mount a direct challenge 
instead—after the rise of the Tibetan empire in the 7th century AD, for example, or the 
Mongol Empire in the 13th century—China was the object of their challenge. British and 
Russian colonialism combined with the decline of the Qing to change this pattern 
beginning in the nineteenth century. After Japan's brief rise to regional dominance in 
the early twentieth century, its subsequent defeat established the United States as the 
predominant regional power in Asia as in other parts of the world. The conclusion of 
civil war in China also meant that China would gradually resume its role as a crucial 
player within the regional system. Other powers meanwhile were rapidly on the decline 
as France left Indochina and Britain held on to only a few key outposts (and those only 
until the end of the century). 
 In order to put in historical perspective the transition and evolution of roles and 
counter-roles among South Korea, Japan, and the United States, we begin with a brief 
review of relations among them leading up to World War II. This review also 
introduces the notation conventions for signed graph theory, which facilitates tracing 
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the structural changes that generated the postwar system of relations among them. In 
the 1930s, Japan occupied Korea, making them a single node in the Sino-U.S.-Japanese 
strategic triad shown in Figure 3. China is also a single node in this figure, although its 
internal dynamics involved a triadic confrontation among nationalist, communist, and 
warlord agents who controlled different parts of China and shared an opposition to 
Japanese encroachment from Korea into China. The US, meanwhile, tended to consider 
Japan a stabilizing influence on the mainland, at least for a time. 
 The early twentieth century was therefore a period of considerable flux in the 
roles of major East Asian powers after a long interval of comparative stability. A decade 
of war culminating in the Japanese defeat in 1945 swept away the prewar Japan-China-
United States triad and established a new international order in which major nodes 
included a unified People’s Republic of China (sans Taiwan), a divided Korea, a 
subordinate Japan, and a victorious United States. Figure 3 depicts this evolving 
regional subsystem and illustrates the role transitions between agents that span these 
three time periods.  
  
         USA           USA           USA 
                                  
                +      +      +              –      +        + 
                          
      CHN          JPN        CHN          JPN        ROK          JPN          
            –               –              (+) 
 
 Early 20th Century  Wartime Triad   Postwar US-led Alliance 
 (Unbalanced)     (Balanced)      (Balanced) 
 CHN|USA: Partners  CHN|USA Partners  ROK|USA: Client|Hegemon 
 USA|JPN: Partners  USA|JPN: Rivals  USA|JPN: Hegemon|Client 
 CHN|JPN: Rebel|Hegemon CHN|JPN: Rivals  ROK|JPN: (Cooperation) 
 
Figure 3. Triadic Relations in East Asia during Three Time Periods 
Cooperation (+); Conflict (-). Unbalanced triads have an odd number of negative (-) relations 
while balanced triads have an even number of negative (-) relations (Harary 1960).  
 
	   19	  
 The roles in the China-Japan role set change from Rebel and Hegemon, 
respectively, to mutual cold war rivals cemented in place by their alliances to the Soviet 
Union and the United States. Japan’s role changed in this re-alignment from a great 
power in the international system to a defeated major member and a U.S. Client. The 
U.S. role toward Japan evolved from a Partner at the beginning of the century to a 
wartime Rival and then to a post-war Hegemon as an occupation power. South Korea 
emerged as a novice member of the international system and became a Client of the 
United States. As allies of the United States against the Sino-Soviet bloc in the early 
years of the cold war, the logic of signed graph theory suggests that South Korea and 
Japan should also align  (+) with each other against China (and the Soviet Union). As 
we shall discuss, however, a postwar domestic politics of "restoration versus 
atonement" has made this relationship fraught. 
 For Japan and South Korea, foreign policy roles since the end of World War II 
have been defined above all by their relationships with the United States and China 
(also to a more limited extent the Soviet Union). After 1945, they were each cast in the 
role of Clients by their alliance with the United States. Domestic role demands initially 
had little to do with the adoption of the Client role, because their political systems were 
"penetrated" (Rosenau 1966; Hanrieder 1967) with relatively little domestic autonomy 
and high receptivity to cues from their postwar military occupier. The United States 
adopted the role of Hegemon in its capacity as the agent of socialization for these two 
states into their new roles as a novice (South Korea) or demotion from a great power to 
a minor member (Japan) in the emerging East Asian regional international system after 
World War II. 
 In the first instance, therefore, international role taking in the East Asian regional 
subsystem was a matter of foreign rather than domestic policy. South Korea and Japan 
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were tightly bound to the United States and reliant on it for their external security. As 
China resumed its role in this system, its relationships with South Korea, Japan, and the 
United States were more conflictual than cooperative (the indeterminate dynamics of 
the US-China-Soviet Union system notwithstanding). These bilateral relationships are 
illustrated as a signed graph in Figure 4. The Soviet Union could be inserted into this 
graph in China's place without changing any of the other signs, incidentally, but we will 
focus here and in what follows on China's interaction with the other three countries.  
     ROK 
         –      + 
      – 
       CHN           USA 
   –       (+)        +     
     JPN 
 Figure 4: Signed Graph of Postwar East Asian Strategic Triads 
 Data Source: See power map of strategic dyads in Appendix I. 
 
 
 In the terms of the Grand Strategy Orientations identified in Figure 1, Japan and 
South Korea both initially pursued Bandwagoning strategies from the upper-left portion 
of Figure 1 as US Clients, while the United States pursued a Hegemonic strategy from the 
lower right portion as a Hegemon toward Japan and South Korea. Japan as a disarmed 
major member demoted to minor member status and South Korea as an emerging 
novice and small state member both initially preferred subordinate relationships with 
the United States as a great power—not necessarily in a permanent or existential sense, 
but in the specific context of the postwar East Asian regional subsystem given the 
devastation of their economies, their general reliance on the United States as an 
occupying power, and the absence of any other viable security alternatives. 
	   21	  
 The hypothesized grand strategies and associated role enactment games for the 
ROK|USA dyad and Japan|USA dyad appear in Figure 5. The steps for specifying the 
hypothesized choice from among the GSOs in Figure 1 for each of the players were: 
first, to decide on Cooperation or Conflict grand strategies; then, second, to pick in 
Figure 1 the variant of a grand strategy (Client or Rebel/Patron or Hegemon) consistent 
with their interests (Vital or Secondary) and their status as Weaker, Equal to, or 
Stronger than Alter.  
 South Korea and Japan were both constrained by their weakness vis-à-vis the US 
to choose from Column 1 in Figure 1. Clearly, in both cases, this relationship affected 
their vital interests. Fundamentally, moreover, both preferred cooperative strategies 
toward the US. They may also have preferred for the US to play as benign and 
cooperative a role as possible, but the majority of postwar Japanese and Korean elites 
(at least the majority to whom the US gave power) preferred to cooperate rather than 
oppose the US even if the latter took a more assertive or dominant approach toward 
Japan and South Korea. It is important to keep in mind that conflictual in the context of 
this game does not signify armed conflict between the US and its Clients. Rather, a 
conflictual strategy (CF) for the US would be one that prioritized and asserted US 
interests over those of Japan or South Korea rather than seeking compromise. 
Unsurprisingly, occupation authorities put in place Korean and Japanese leaders who 
themselves accepted and supported this US dominance, at least for a time. US 
dominance (CF in this game) did have the double virtue of keeping the US actively 
engaged in the protection of these states while, at the same time, suppressing internal 
dissent. Although this would change over time, very quickly in Japan, it remained 
preferable for many early Cold War South Korean elites to a more egalitarian 
relationship that would also have meant tougher choices at home. In these 
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circumstances, US dominance was the security guarantee, and so the ROK government 
continued for a time to prefer subordination (CO,CF) even over cooperation (CO,CO). 
The resulting strategy, for Japan and South Korea, is a variant of Bandwagoning 
identified as GSO #4 in Figure 1. They were also constrained, as shown in Figure 4, to 
cooperative relationships with each other by virtue of their subordination within the 
US-dominated triad. 5  
        #24        #24          #24 
(NC) Alter (US)  (NC) Alter (US)  (G2) Alter (US)  
   CO CF   CO CF   CO CF  
  CO 3,2 4,4*  CO 3,2 4,4*  CO 4,2   è  "3,4" * 
   Ego (ROK) #4   Ego (JPN) #4   Ego (JPN) #10  é   ê  
  CF 2,1 1,3  CF 2,1 1,3  CF 2,1   ç 1,3 
 
 Ego Role: Weak Client (–, <) Ego Role: Weak Client (–, <) Ego Role: Weak Partner (–, <) 
 Alter Role: Strong Hegemon (–, >) Alter Role: Strong Hegemon (–, >) Alter Role: Strong Hegemon (–, >)  
I. Postwar ROK|US  II. Early Postwar JPN|US  III. JPN|US 1950s-1960s 
 
Figure 5: Intersections of ROK-US and Japan-US Grand Strategy Orientations 
during the Era of Strong American Dominance 
 Outcomes are ranked from 4 (highest) to 1 (lowest). CO = Cooperation; CF = Conflict. Games: G- 
numbers for conflict games are from Brams (1994); NC are No Conflict games where both players  
rank the same outcome highest (4,4). Role Demands: Vital (-) and Secondary (+). Interests: Weaker  
(<), Equal (=), Stronger (>) Power. Initial States are in quotation marks. Nash myopic equilibria  
are asterisked; Brams nonmyopic equilibria are in bold. 
 
 
 From the US perspective, playing a Hegemonic strategy meant that the preferred 
relationship with both Japan and the Republic of Korea was one of American 
dominance and subordination on the part of the United States' East Asian Clients 
(CF,CO). Even for the US, vital interests were at stake, and thus the US adopted a 
Hegemon variant GSO (#24) at the bottom-right corner of Figure 1. The intersection of 
the roles and corresponding strategies for relations between the US and both South 
Korea and Japan are identical and shown as the first and second 2x2 ordinal games in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 This was far from a moot point since the new South Korean government under 
Syngmann Rhee would have preferred a more antagonistic relationship with Japan, and 
formal peace negotiations between the two US allies went nowhere (Yang 1999). We 
depict this relationship as de facto cooperation (+) in Figure 4, which is the predicted 
relationship that balances the US-ROK-JPN triad according to graph theory. 
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Figure 5. The intersection of strategies constructs the same game with (4,4) as the 
nonmyopic equilibrium that defines each ally’s role as a Client in relation to the US 
counter-role as the US Hegemon.  
 In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, therefore, Japan and South 
Korea embraced identical role enactment strategies in their relationships with the 
United States. Deference to the United States was the only option as a practical matter, 
and there were reasons to prefer it both internationally (to secure American support) 
and domestically (to suppress dissident groups).  
 Because the Japanese government was able to secure its domestic position far 
more quickly than the South Korean government, however, it would soon be in a 
position to prefer a more equal, rather than purely subordinate, relationship with the 
US. Japanese postwar politics were thus rapidly characterized by the dynamics of 
Appeasement with the US, in which Japan sought to cooperate with the US and to give 
Americans what they required while preserving as much latitude for itself as possible 
and working as quickly as possible to regain a more equal footing (see the third 2x2 
game in Figure 5). This tension resulted in some role strain (difficulty in role enactment) 
for Japan’s conservative government. The outcome of this new game (GSO #10 for 
Japan and #24 for the US) is predicted to be submission by Japan and domination by the 
US. Unlike the immediate postwar period, this new game permitted clockwise 
"cycling"6 from (3,4) by Japan, which made it more difficult for the US to maintain the 
(CO,CF) nonmyopic equilibrium of (3,4), Japanese submission and US domination.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Brams (1994: 221) defines a cyclic game as follows: "A 2 x 2 strictly ordinal game is … 
cyclic if moves either in a clockwise or counterclockwise direction never give a player 
its best payoff when it has the next move." A player who can cycle continuously from 
the nonmyopic equilibrium to a cell with a better payoff with the next move can 
prolong the final outcome indefinitely so long as s/he is willing to spend the 
transaction cost (see Brams 1994: 27-28, 88-94).  
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 Once Japan's new constitution was in place in May 1947, Japanese leaders very 
quickly discovered some leeway to play on US fears of Russian influence, and they used 
this leeway primarily to disengage Japan from further regional entanglement. The 
Yoshida Doctrine, formulated by Japan's first major postwar prime minister, was 
notable as an accomplishment of role-taking both domestically and internationally. 
Domestically, Yoshida Shigeru's concern was to create institutional constraints limiting 
a resurgence of militarism (which, it was evident, had led Japan badly astray in the 
previous two decades) while at the same suppressing a political reaction that forced 
Japan to the left. Yoshida laid the foundation for the emergence of the Liberal 
Democratic Party (Japan's conservative party), for a patronage politics that cemented its 
influence, and for institutional bargains that preserved the role of a conservative 
bureaucracy that dominated the Japanese state (Dower 1979). In this way, Yoshida 
managed to preserve the influence of a centralized and comparatively strong state over 
Japanese society, and in particular over political forces such as labor unions that he 
mistrusted. 
 At the same time, Yoshida's quick embrace of the MacArthur constitution was a 
deft political compromise. Although it did not give conservatives everything they 
wanted (and these regrets are an important refrain in contemporary Japanese politics), 
the constitution and the defense treaty that followed with the United States had the 
enormous virtue of cementing a US-Japan alliance without committing Japan to 
rearmament. As the United States turned its attention to war in Korea, it soon regretted 
the stipulation that Japan would not re-arm. For Yoshida, on the other hand, Article 9 
(the peace clause) was exactly what he needed to hold the US at arms length and to 
prevent entanglement in another war while turning his attention instead to economic 
re-development (see Pyle 1992; Weber and Kowert 2007).  
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 In general, then, Yoshida was able to operate within the constraints of American 
dominance to get much of what he wanted: political arrangements at home that 
preserved the influence of conservatives, and the state more generally, while excluding 
militarists; and a defensive alliance with the US that committed Japan to nothing and 
expressly forbade re-militarization. The domestic and international objectives 
reinforced each other and, together, defined a role for the Japanese government that has 
persisted in its general contours until the present. 
 If Yoshida experienced great success in carving out a certain degree of autonomy 
for Japan, and in putting in place the foundation for the "1955 System" of conservative 
political dominance at home, Japan was nevertheless constrained to a Client role in its 
foreign policy. The domestic political costs of the 1960 Security Treaty revision perfectly 
illustrate this status. Although the opportunity to renegotiate the Security Treaty 
initially held the promise of placing US-Japan relations on a somewhat more equal basis 
(if not yet quite that of Partners), these hopes were quickly dashed by the left-right rift 
within Japan over the treaty negotiations (Packard 1966).  
 By the time Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke finally managed to push through a 
treaty that committed the US to little more than a vague promise of "consultation" with 
Japan before the use of American bases on Japanese territory, the issue had grown so 
contentious that he was obliged to resign after the Diet approved the treaty and 
Eisenhower was forced to cancel his planned visit to Japan in the wake of massive anti-
American protests in Tokyo. Clearly there were domestic political costs to be paid as a 
result of Japan's subordinate international status. 
 In South Korea, meanwhile, Syngman Rhee, operated at a similar nexus of 
domestic and international politics, though with concerns that were even more pressing 
than those faced by Yoshida and Kishi. Direct US military administration ended in 1948, 
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but the South Korean military dominated internal politics, excepting the brief interlude 
of the Second Republic (1960-1961), until the advent of the Sixth Republic in 1987. Even 
the first president of the Sixth Republic, Roh Tae-woo, had a military background. 
Perhaps this is unsurprising given South Korea's far less stable security environment 
and the persistence of a state of war with the North. For Yoshida, the threat of the left 
was real enough, but in South Korea it was existential. This meant that Rhee was 
completely unable to achieve the sort of latitude that Japan enjoyed in its relations with 
the United States. South Korea and the Rhee government in particular were far more 
dependent on American support. Whereas domestic political arrangements in Japan 
grew out of a bargain that held the US at a certain distance and allowed the LDP to 
dominate patronage politics internally, both Rhee and the South Korean military relied 
on the US. In fact, foreign aid from the United States "constituted a third of [the] total 
[South Korean] budget in 1954, rose to 58.4 percent in 1956, and was approximately 38 
percent of the budget in 1960" (Savad and Shaw 1997: 36). It is worth keeping in mind, 
moreover, that the South was less industrialized than the North in this era, and this 
further exacerbated its economic dependency on the US. For all of these reasons, the key 
political coalition in South Korea was external (with the US) rather than internal (as was 
increasingly the case in Japan). As a matter of fairly crude generalization, therefore, the 
political coalitions that dominated South Korean politics in the early Cold War era were 
closely linked to the military and, as such, externally dependent on the United States. 
This arrangement bound South Korea tightly within what Katzenstein (2005) called the 
"American imperium."  
 Katzenstein's phrase, "the American imperium," is a pithy summary of American 
role taking not only in the context of the US-Japan-South Korea triad, but in US 
relations with many other countries as well from 1945 onward. Having finally and 
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reluctantly assumed the mantle of international leadership, American elites gradually 
but overwhelmingly came to see this as the natural and inevitable role for the United 
States. Internationalism replaced isolationism as the new foreign policy consensus in the 
United States (Holsti and Rosenau 1986; cf. Hartz 1955). But it was not only a more 
thorough internationalism that set the new US foreign policy apart from that of the 
republic's first 150 years. Internationalism was accompanied by a conviction that the 
United States must play a distinct, hegemonic role in the postwar world. John F. 
Kennedy drew on the inspired phrasing of his compatriot, Massachusetts Bay Colony 
founder John Winthrop, and on the imagery of the Sermon on the Mount to declare that 
the United States must be a city upon a hill, serving as an example to other countries. 
More succinctly, the US must be a leader. Charles Kindleberger (1973) fleshed out the 
intellectual underpinnings for this conviction in response to fears of a new Great 
Depression. By the time Robert Keohane (1984) formalized this notion as hegemonic 
stability theory, it had already become canonical among US elites. 
 
Period II: The Rise of Japan 
 As Japan became the "country that could say no," it entered a new era in its 
relations with the United States (Ishihara and Morita 1989). Perhaps this era could be 
said to have begun with Prime Minister Satō Eisaku's enunciation of the three non-
nuclear principles in 1967.7  Symbolically, at least, these principles distanced Japan from 
US nuclear deterrence, one of the linchpins of American grand strategy. But the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The Three Non-nuclear Principles held that nuclear weapons would not be produced 
in Japan, possessed by Japan, or introduced into Japan. The third principle was made 
somewhat moot by American refusal to comment on whether US ships or warplanes in 
Japan carried nuclear armament. In 2010, Japanese officials confirmed the existence of 
secret pacts with the US whereby the Japanese government assented to the presence of 
American nuclear weapons in Japan (Fackler 2010). 
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underlying development that sustained an evolution of Japan-US relations was the 
growth of Japan's economic clout.  
 As the decade of the 1970s began, Japan had finally reached rough parity with 
France and West Germany in real per capita GDP (Tipton 2008: 192). US spending on 
the war in Vietnam had undeniably been an economic boon to Japan. By the 1970s, 
however, strategic decisions taken by Japan's Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI) were having an independent effect (Johnson 1982). Japan celebrated its 
new technological prowess at the 1970 World Exposition in Osaka. By 1976, Japan, with 
three percent of the world's population, accounted for ten percent of global economic 
output (Andressen 2002). 
 Meanwhile, in 1971, President Nixon took the United States off the gold standard 
(without bothering to consult Japan). The Nixon Shock, and the oil shocks that 
followed, encouraged sentiments of self-reliance in Japanese foreign economic policy. 
Okinawa's reversion to Japanese control, also in 1971, removed another important 
symbol of Japanese subordination to the United States. The seeds of later political 
developments were sown in this era. As the decade of the 1960s came to an end, a series 
of high profile environmental lawsuits over industrial pollution captured headlines 
(Tipton 2008: 199-200). Then, at almost the same time that Nixon was undone by the 
Watergate scandal, Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei succumbed to a bribery 
scandal involving Lockheed Corporation.  
 Tellingly, the Prime Minister’s successor, Miki Takeo, took office at the head of a 
"clean government" movement. But Tanaka retained his seat in the Diet where he 
controlled the LDP faction that brokered key leadership positions for the next decade 
and eventually brought Nakasone Yasuhiro to power in 1982. Although Japan would 
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effectively remain a single party democracy (Pempel 1990) throughout this period, the 
seeds of public dissatisfaction with the LDP had taken root. 
 The 1980s brought the apotheosis of Japanese economic power. This era was 
bracketed by the publication of Ezra Vogel's Japan as Number One and, a decade later, 
Ishihara and Morita's (1989) The Japan that Can Say "No," the latter coming just before 
the bottom fell out of Japan's bubble economy. At its peak, real estate speculation drove 
up land values, particularly in Tokyo, to absurd levels. The value of the land under the 
imperial palace in Tokyo was estimated, at this time, to be equivalent to the value of all 
land in California (Kindleberger and Aliber 2011: 173). By the summer of 1989, the 
world's eight largest banks were all Japanese (Frantz 1989). 
 Japan's capabilities grew explosively during this era. And Ishihara and Morita's 
(1989) point, of course, was that its military capabilities were increasing, at least 
implicitly, along with its economic capabilities. This in itself led to a shift in Japan's role 
enactment with the United States. Although neither Japan nor the United States' basic 
strategies changed within this dyad, the game variations played by each changed as 
their overall capabilities approached parity, particularly in economic terms. Each 
became less tolerant of conflictual strategies enacted by alter. Put another way, there 
were greater demands for reciprocity in their relations. For the United States, this 
particularly meant reciprocity in economic relations, greater access to the Japanese 
market, and a reduction in the dyadic trade imbalance. In Japan, slowly at first but 
picking up momentum after Nakasone took office, it meant a cautious desire for 
diplomatic reciprocity that would give Japan and independent presence in world 
affairs, while continuing to pledge strategic support to the US. As the LDP consolidated 
its power within Japan, moreover, domestic politics meant intra-party factional politics. 
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The key political coalitions within Japan were, by this time, almost completely inward-
looking. 
 The same could not be said in South Korea, where Cold War security politics and 
an evident US-ROK power imbalance still dominated the political scene. As in Japan-US 
relations, however, the 1970s ushered in a series of shocks to the ROK-US alliance. 
President Nixon's decision to pull 20,000 US troops out of South Korea in 1971 was a 
slightly-more-dramatic-than-usual instance of a recurring theme: the ROK 
government's fear of abandonment. President Park Chung-hee, who led South Korea 
from 1961 until his assassination in 1979, was prompted by the troop withdrawal to 
declare that the American presence in South Korea was "absolutely necessary until we 
have developed our own capability to cope successfully with North Korea" (New York 
Times, June 24, 1970; quoted in Snyder 2009: 4). Later in the same decade, President 
Carter attempted even more extensive cuts, citing the poor human rights record of 
Park's government. The North Korean threat continued to make the government in 
Seoul dependent on the United States in a way that Japan was only briefly during the 
era of direct occupation. Throughout this period, the United States also remained by far 
South Korea's largest international trading partner (Kang 2003). 
 When President Park was suddenly assassinated in 1979 by the Chief of the 
Korean Central Intelligence Agency, the resulting political instability prompted a 
military coup d'état by General Chun Doo-hwan only six days after Prime Minister 
Choi Kyu-hah succeeded Park as president. In the following year, pro-democracy 
protests broke out all over the country, prompting Chun to declare martial law on May 
17, 1980. The next day, a protest in Gwangju led by university students was brutally 
suppressed, with nearly 200 fatalities. The Gwangju Massacre became a cause célèbre 
for the democracy movement. When a Seoul National University student died in police 
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custody in 1987, public outrage led to massive protests that prompted a constitutional 
referendum and the inauguration of the Sixth Republic with a direct presidential 
election. 
 Although the 1970s and 1980s were characterized by undemocratic regimes in 
South Korea, therefore, they nevertheless brought an important political transition. 
Even before the ROK's shift toward democracy in 1987, a more subtle change had taken 
place. Internal politics, which had been utterly dominated by war with the North and 
heavily influenced by the United States, took on an internal life of its own. The US still 
played a crucial role, to be sure, and the ROK government remained dependent on this 
alliance for its external security. But the shift toward democracy also marked a shift 
towards an internally driven politics of corruption reform and economic rejuvenation. 
 The politics of clean government and economic growth were familiar to 
Americans of the same era, of course. The Watergate Scandal propelled first Gerald 
Ford and then Jimmy Carter into the presidency under the banner of restoring 
Americans' faith in their government. The decade that began with the collapse of the 
gold standard also saw massive increases in energy prices and the rapid decline of the 
US auto industry, and concluded with a humiliating hostage crisis in Iran. It was an era 
that begged for a new politics of American strength (Winter 1987).  
 At the same time, the failure of the war in Vietnam meant that the desire for 
American strength was gradually decoupled from the willingness to translate this 
strength into support for American designs on an international stage. Instead, the 
purpose of American power shifted from institution building to freedom: freedom from 
the Soviet threat, freedom from perceived inequities in trade relationships, and freedom 
from humiliating encounters like the failed hostage rescue attempt and, more generally, 
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the Vietnam War. This led gradually to an interesting dualism in US strategic thought: 
internationalism was on the decline, but a commitment to American leadership was not.  
To put this dynamic in the terms of Figure 1 and the four basic grand strategy 
role orientations, the US embrace of a hegemonic role did not change. US politicians 
continued as ever to talk of the necessity of American leadership. But the purposes to 
which this leadership would be put changed and grew more restrictive. For many, the 
purpose of this leadership was forthrightly self-serving. The rationale for American 
power was to restore American power itself. Even those who saw the advent of new 
forms of American "soft power" (Nye 1990) envisioned this power primarily as a 
mechanism for advancing US interests.  
As a result, the US was less tolerant of international relationships that did not 
clearly serve US interests. The preferential treatment in international trade accorded 
Japan and South Korea would have to give way as the US enactment of the Hegemon 
role shifted to a new Grand Strategy Orientation of rivalry vis-à-vis Japan (compare 
Figure 5 to Figure 6). Lacking the capability to enact a Strong Hegemonic strategy, the 
US reverted to a Hegemonic strategy (GSO #23) of ranking preferences consistent with 
an ordinary Hegemon in which it was possible to be coupled with an Alter of equal 
capability. 
 At the same time that the US began its retreat from unequivocal internationalism, 
a domestic political realignment was also underway. The election of Ronald Reagan 
heralded what Stephen Skowronek (1993) has called a new cycle in American political 
time. Many forces were at work in this realignment, including the decline of labor 
unions, the political emergence of evangelical Christians, and the aftereffects of the 1964 
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Civil Rights Act and the 1973 Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade.8  Whatever the 
causes, these shifts set the stage for a more inward-looking political environment in the 
United States in the decades that followed. 
 In general, although the international relations of Japan, South Korea, and the 
United States remained relatively cooperative in this middle period, the rise of Japan 
and decline of the United States shifted somewhat the game variants each perceived 
itself as playing to enact their roles. Japan preferred an Appeasement role leading to 
mutual cooperation with the US, but it had gained the economic clout to insist on 
something in return (and to ignore US entreaties for greater access to Japanese markets 
if it chose). The US continued to prefer a dominant relationship towards both Japan and 
South Korea, and it also grew less tolerant toward perceived defections. The issue of 
reciprocity thus became central to US-Japan relations.  
       #23        #20         #23 
 (G27) Alter (US)  (G31) Alter (US)  (NC) Alter (US)  
  CO CF   CO CF   CO CF 
 CO 4,3  |ç  1,4  CO        "4,3"  è  1,4  CO 3,3         "4,4" * 
    __ 
  Ego (JPN)#11 é   é  Ego (JPN)#11 é  ê  Ego (ROK)#4 
 
 CF 2,1   ç  "3,2" *  CF 2,2   ç 3,1  CF 2,1 1,2  
 
 Ego Role: Partner (–, =)  Ego Role: Partner (–, =)  Ego Role: Weak Client (–, <) 
 Alter Role: Hegemon (–, =)  Alter Role: Hegemon (+, =) Alter Role: Hegemon (–,=)  
I. JPN|US 1970s-1980s II. US Secondary Interests    III. ROK|US 1970s-1980s 
 
Figure 6: Role Transitions and Role Strains Affecting Grand Strategies in US-
Japan and US-ROK Relations in the 1970s and 1980s. 
 Outcomes are ranked from 4 (highest) to 1 (lowest). CO = Cooperation; CF = Conflict. Games: G- 
numbers for conflict games are from Brams (1994); NC are No Conflict games where both players  
rank the same outcome highest (4,4). Role Demands: Vital (-) and Secondary (+). Interests: Weaker  
(<), Equal (=), Stronger (>) Power. Initial States are in quotation marks. Nash myopic equilibria  
are asterisked; Brams nonmyopic equilibria are in bold. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 For an overview of ideological shifts in public opinion, and an argument that they 
actually came after the "Reagan revolution" rather than before, see Abramowitz and 
Saunders (1998). 
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 The games in Figure 6 formalize the role transitions and role strains in US 
relations with Japan and South Korea in the later days of the Cold War. The ROK-US 
dyad remains relatively unchanged with a nonmyopic equilibrium of (CO,CF), as the 
US role transitions from a Strong Hegemon (#24) to a Hegemon (#23) strategy of 
domination as the highest-ranked outcome and the Weak Client counter-role strategy 
(#4) remains the ROK counter-role. The ROK-US game thus persists as a No Conflict 
game with a (4,4) outcome. Japan’s transition from a Weak Partner role (#10) to a 
Partner role (#11), coupled with a transition by the US from a Strong Hegemon (#24) to 
a Hegemon (#23) role, leads logically to a loss of U.S. domination as a stable 
equilibrium in Brams' Game 27. Both the United States and Japan can block domination 
by the other player, leading to a deadlock outcome (3,2) as a stable but Pareto-inferior 
equilibrium. The path in Game 27 to the Pareto-inferior equilibrium of mutual 
cooperation (4,3) from deadlock (3,2) logically requires the US to choose "move" from 
(3,2) to (2,1) for Japan to then choose "move" to (4,3). Japan will not logically choose 
"move," because it leads to (1,4) where US will logically choose "stay" rather than move 
to (4,3). 
 If the US changes its assessment of interests from Vital (–) to Secondary (+) and 
to the corresponding Hegemon strategy (#20) shown in Brams' Game 31 (see the middle 
game in Figure 6), then the outcome is mutual cooperation (4,3) as a nonmyopic 
equilibrium. The US can "cycle" clockwise to postpone the logically inevitable (4,3) 
outcome with Tokyo, but Washington cannot reach a domination outcome (1,4) as an 
equilibrium in this game.	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Period III. The Rise of China (and South Korea) 
 The role transitions in US-Japanese relations and the role strains experienced by 
the US in US-ROK relations during the 1980s masked a pattern of deeper change, as 
political developments in all three countries at the end of the Cold War along with the 
rise of China helped set the stage for an emergent conflict in their three-way alliance 
relations. If the rise of Japan dramatically increased tension in the bilateral US-Japanese 
relationship, then one might expect Japan's relative decline beginning in the 1990s to 
have the opposite effect, and for a time it did. Yet this decline was accompanied by two 
other developments, one obvious and the other less so, that introduced very different 
tensions. The more obvious of these developments was the rise of China and the 
concomitant strengthening of security cooperation among all three states in the US-led 
Asian alliance system. At the same time, however, domestic political incentives in both 
South Korea and Japan set off new forms of antagonism that had been dormant for 
many years.  
 Although it has become apparent that the bursting Japanese real estate and stock 
market bubble exposed important weaknesses in Japanese banking regulation and fiscal 
policy (Krugman 1998), this was less obvious in the early 1990s. Fingleton (1995) 
argued, at least for a time, that Japan remained on course to overtake the United States 
as the world's largest economy. What was perhaps more obvious, both inside and 
outside Japan, is that Japan could not continue to play the role of the world's banker 
without political and strategic consequences. The Persian Gulf War was a new sort of 
international crisis for Japanese leaders.  
For the first time in 45 years, the threat was not that Japan would be dragged into 
a conflict by the United States, but instead that it was seen as irrelevant despite 
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bankrolling the international coalition's war effort to the tune of $13 billion. As 
Funabashi (1991: 58) summed up the dawning realization: 
A crisis almost always reveals the reality, and the Persian Gulf crisis 
revealed the real Japan. In the moment of truth, an economic superpower 
found itself merely an automatic teller machine—one that needed a kick 
before dispensing the cash. The notion that economic power inevitably 
translates into geopolitical influence turned out to be a materialist illusion. 
At least many Japanese now seem to subscribe to that view. 
 
The LDP, and particularly its right wing, concluded that Japan needed a far more robust 
set of institutions for political and even military-strategic engagement with the rest of 
the world.  
 The LDP eventually managed to enact a law authorizing the deployment of 
Japanese peacekeepers outside Japan. It's passage arguably helped take down not one 
but two Prime Ministers: Kaifu Toshiki, whose administration managed (or mis-
managed) the initial response to the Gulf War and proposed a new peacekeeping 
operations (PKO) law; and Miyazawa Kiichi, under whose leadership a version of the 
PKO law was finally passed in 1992. Between this politically divisive measure, 
President Bush's disastrous trip to Japan seeking trade concessions for the US, and the 
failure of the Japanese economy to rebound, the stage was set in Japan for a dramatic 
political shake-up. 
 In a general election on July 18, 1993, for the first time since its formation in 1955, 
the LDP lost power and became an opposition party after Ichirō Ozawa brokered an 
agreement with the support of socialists and social democrats to elect Hosokawa 
Morihiro as Prime Minister. This government lasted for only eleven months. In order to 
regain power, however, the LDP formed an alliance with its erstwhile opposition, the 
Japan Socialist Party (JSP). One condition of this alliance was that the JSP accept the 
LDP interpretation of Article 9 as allowing Japan to maintain "self-defense forces."  In a 
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single stroke, the JSP attained power and destroyed its own power base by repudiating 
a central principle of its political platform for the past half century (that the peace 
constitution permitted no military forces of any kind). 
 These developments inaugurated a new era in Japanese domestic politics in 
several important respects. They represent, to begin with, the end of the 1955 System 
and the beginnings of a new era of party politics without party ideology. Prior to 1993, 
the two principle political parties in Japan, the LDP and the JSP, took very clear 
ideological positions (on the right and left, respectively). Yet the JSP never attained 
enough support to generate true party politics within Japan. Instead, as already noted, 
the most important political divisions shaping policy were those among LDP factions.  
 After 1993, inter-party competition became much more intense, and yet the 
parties lost their ideological attachments. The principal opposition party today, the 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) is often hard to distinguish from the LDP ideologically. 
This ideological ambiguity notwithstanding, however, Japan's political parties must 
find new ways to appeal to voters. The LDP in particular can no longer expect to treat 
rule as an internal matter to be managed within the party. It must compete. And it is in 
this context that conservatives such as Abe Shinzō have embraced a more divisive 
politics of national chauvinism. Before saying more about the consequences of Japan's 
newfound nationalism, however, it will be helpful to turn to the South Korean case. 
 In South Korea, democratization also brought economic dynamism. Figure 7 
shows the pattern of growth in GPD per capita (as a percentage of the OECD-15 
average) that began as democracy took hold in South Korea in the late 1980s. Over the 
course of the next two decades, and despite the important but momentary downturn 
caused by the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the South Korean economy steadily grew to 
the position of the twelfth largest economy in the world, on a par with Canada and 
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Mexico (measured using PPP adjusted GDP; see World Bank 2013). Woosang Kim 
(2007) thus argues that South Korea has become a "middle power" in the East Asian 
regional subsystem.  
 
  Figure 7: GPD Per Capita in Selected Countries of the Asian Pacific  
 as a Percentage of Average GDP Per Capita in the OECD-15 
 Source: Parkinson 2011. 
 
 
 As the South Korean economy took off, its political relationship with the United 
States also began to improve after the low point of President Carter's objections to Park 
Chung-hee's human rights record and threats of a major troop withdrawal. Ronald 
Reagan, in contrast, saw South Korea through the lens of the Cold War as a steadfast 
ally in the struggle against communism (Cha 1999: 170-175). As fears subsided in Seoul 
(and Tokyo) of a US withdrawal, suppressed tensions began to bubble up. One of the 
most important, and least suppressed, was public frustration in South Korea over the 
impact of a large US military presence in the country, particularly as Washington and 
Seoul began to diverge in their approaches to Pyongyang. After President Kim Dae-
jung adopted a new "Sunshine Policy" toward the North in the late 1990s, South Korean 
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and American policy were increasingly at odds. Kim and his successor, Roh Moo-hyun, 
sought to open up new avenues of communication with the North, whereas the United 
States mostly sought to isolate Pyongyang. Then, with public sentiment already 
swinging toward the view that the United States was obstructing rather encouraging 
progress with the North, two 14-year-old Korean schoolgirls were struck and killed by 
an armored vehicle in a US military convoy on June 13, 2002. The public outpouring of 
grief was immediate and sustained. In November of the same year, the soldiers 
operating the vehicle were acquitted on charges of negligent homicide, further 
inflaming the public response. Protests over the "Yangju Highway Incident" erupted 
across the country, and the death of the two girls has been commemorated annually 
ever since. 
 As South Korea's relationship with Washington began to deteriorate, so did its 
relationship with Tokyo. Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro's visit to 
Yasukuni Shrine on August 15, 1985 to mark the fortieth anniversary of the end of 
World War II prompted bitter criticism, from China and South Korea in particular. 
Nakasone was the first Japanese Prime Minister to visit Yasukuni (which enshrines 
Japan's war dead, including those classified as war criminals) since the end of the war, 
and he did not repeat the visit given the controversy it provoked. Beginning in 2001, 
however, Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro made a series of visits to the shrine that 
further inflamed the issue so that it has become a litmus test for the prime minister in 
Japan-China and Japan-South Korea relations. The leaders of both China and South 
Korea thereafter refused to meet with Koizumi. When Prime Minister Abe Shinzō 
visited the Shrine on December 26, 2013, even the United States expressed its 
disappointment. The South Korean government called it a "'deplorable and 
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anachronistic act' that would damage bilateral relations and stability in northeast Asia" 
(Soble, Anderlini, and Song 2013). 
 One reason Abe may have felt at liberty to visit Yasukuni Shrine, playing to a key 
political constituency, is that he had very little to lose in terms of the effect on relations 
with South Korea. Other controversies had already left Japan-South Korean relations in 
tatters. Protests erupted in 2001, for example, over newly approved Japanese textbooks 
that appeared to whitewash Japan's wartime actions (see Saaler 2006). An official visit 
by South Korean President Lee Myung-bak to the disputed Liancourt Rocks (Dokdo in 
Korean; Takeshima in Japanese) provoked a backlash in Japan, prompting it to 
temporarily withdraw its ambassador from Seoul (Asahi Shimbun 2012). And although 
Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi issued an apology in 1994 to those sexually 
enslaved by Japan's armies during the war, recent statements by senior Japanese 
officials have tended to undermine the apology (see, e.g., Asahi Shimbun 2013; on the 
fraught nature of state apologies, see Lind 2008). Increasingly, South Korea and Japan 
simply weren't speaking the same language. From the time of the Chun government 
onward, in fact, this was quite literally the case, as the new generation of South Korean 
leaders replaced an earlier generation of leaders who had learned Japanese in school. 
 If the trend in Japan-South Korean relations has generally been negative over the 
course of the past two decades, relations with the US have been more complicated for 
both countries. As noted above, South Koreans took a dimmer view of their alliance 
with the US as Washington began to take a harsher line toward Pyongyang, and 
particularly after the Yangju Highway Incident. At the same time, the United States was 
becoming less important to South Korea economically. Whereas the US accounted for 
40% of South Korea's international trade in the mid-1980s, this pattern shifted markedly 
thereafter. Trade with East Asia increased, while the US share of South Korean exports 
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fell by 50% at the century's end (as did the Japanese share). China, meanwhile, rose to 
become the single largest importer of South Korean products (Kang 2003: 194). Some 
Koreans and Americans began to advocate a US drawdown, precisely what South 
Korea had most feared a decade earlier (see Bandow and Carpenter 1992). 
 Others drew the opposite conclusion. The 1995 "United States Security Strategy 
for the East Asia Pacific Region" (the Nye Report) emphasized the importance of a 
forward US presence in East Asia (Nye 2001). The collapse of the 1994 Agreed 
Framework for negotiations with North Korea over nuclear technology also prompted 
some to stress the important of renewed cooperation among the US, Japan, and South 
Korea, as did the US proclamation of a "global war on terror" (Hughes 2007). And in 
2012, the Obama administration proclaimed a "pivot to East Asia" in US defense policy 
(Clinton 2011; Lieberthal 2011). Meanwhile, over 70 percent of South Koreans still say 
they support the alliance with the United States (Snyder 2013). And Japanese sentiment 
toward the US is also considerably warmer than in the 1980s and 1990s (see Hughes 
2007). 
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I. JPN|US 1990s Onward II. ROK|US 1990s Onward    III. Client|US Alternative 
 
Figure 8: Intersections of US-Japan and US-South Korea Role Dyads and 
Grand Strategies from the 1990s to the Present 
 Outcomes are ranked from 4 (highest) to 1 (lowest). CO = Cooperation; CF = Conflict. Games: G- 
numbers for conflict games are from Brams (1994); NC are No Conflict games where both players  
rank the same outcome highest (4,4). Role Demands: Vital (-) and Secondary (+). Interests: Weaker  
(<), Equal (=), Stronger (>) Power. Initial States are in quotation marks. Nash myopic equilibria  
are asterisked; Brams nonmyopic equilibria are in bold. 
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 The games in Figure 8 reflect the shift in the US role from Hegemon (#23) back to 
Strong Hegemon (#24) and a continued strategy of domination following the end of the 
Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union. The counter-roles of Japan and South 
Korea after the cold war converge as US Partners with the same Appeasement GSO in 
their relations with the United States. The outcome of the ROK-US game is predicted to 
be submission by South Korea and domination by the US; however, the game (G2) 
permits clockwise "cycling" by South Korea so that it is more difficult for the US to 
maintain the (CO,CF) nonmyopic equilibrium of (3,4) submission by Seoul and 
domination by Washington. The predicted outcome in Figure 8 for the US-Japan game 
is deadlock (3,3) as a nonmyopic equilibrium. 
 The different outcomes in Game 24 and Game 2 are due to the different variants 
of the Appeasement strategy pursued by Japan and South Korea as Partners against the 
Strong Hegemonic strategy of the US Hegemon. Japan’s Appeasement strategy (#11) 
permits Tokyo to block US domination and make deadlock (3,3) a nonmyopic 
equilibrium while Seoul’s Weak Appeasement strategy (#10) is sufficient to delay but 
not to prevent the US preference for domination (3,4). One resolution of the outcomes 
for these two games is the No Conflict game in Figure 8, wherein the U.S. transitions 
from a Hegemon to a Patron role enacted with a Strong Appeasement strategy (#12) 
leading to a nonmyopic equilibrium of (4,4) mutual cooperation. This Grand Strategy 
Orientation complements either Partner strategy of the allies and is consistent with the 
Obama Administration’s emphasis on multilateral partnerships with both allies and 
clients based on mutual cooperation rather than US domination. 
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Perturbation in the US-Japan-South Korea Triad 
 To this point, by tracking the evolution of domestic and intra-alliance politics 
within the US-Japan-South Korea triad, as well as shifts in the international distribution 
of power, we have sought to show that the three constituent dyads in this alliance 
experienced a gradual evolution over the course of the past seventy years. First Japan 
and then South Korea shifted their Grand Strategy Orientations to reflect preferences 
for a more cooperative (rather than subordinate) relationship with the United States as 
their increasing power and capabilities placed them on a more equal footing with the 
United States, though still in an inferior position. The United States meanwhile 
remained fairly constant in its GSO, generally preferring a strong form of Hegemony. 
We said little about dyadic relations in the third leg of this triad, JPN|ROK, during the 
first and second periods (the 1950s-1960s and the 1970s-1980s, respectively) because 
they were so thoroughly subordinated to these countries' relationships with the United 
States. Yet in the third period, from the 1990s onward, Japan-South Korean relations 
took on an increasingly turbulent life of their own. 
 As Chinese power has risen, and in response to threats from North Korea, Japan 
and South Korea have had important reasons to deepen their own dyadic security 
cooperation in addition to cooperation brokered or mandated by the US. And at times, 
they have done just that. Gradually, however, their dyadic relations have broken down 
in a way that is not anticipated by the signed graph in Figure 4. Insofar as Japan and 
South Korea remain allied with the United States, and insofar as all three perceive 
threats elsewhere in Asia, they should remain close partners. Lingering animosity, 
temporarily suppressed by the United States, plausibly explains the breakdown in the 
Japan-ROK relationship. But the broader strategic situation suggests that the timing is 
odd. The US, Japan, and South Korea have more reason to cooperate now rather than 
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less as China grows stronger, depending on whether or not Beijing pursues a 
Hegemon’s role toward them. 
 Yet there has been a gradual shift toward more inward-looking political 
coalitions across all three states. Even the United States, whose power immunized it 
from a preoccupation with international politics up to a point, nevertheless saw the 
postwar internationalist consensus gradually eroded, in part by events in Asia (notably 
the war in Vietnam). In Japan, the period during which domestic political coalitions 
depended on American influence was surprisingly brief after Yoshida Shigeru 
successfully fabricated the political coalition that led to the rise of the LDP. This period 
lasted longer in South Korea, in good measure precisely because the process of 
democratization took longer. As it did, however, internal politics was fractured to a far 
greater extent than in Japan. In the twenty-first century, the domestic political 
arrangements of all three countries are characterized by coalition politics that are 
primarily inward looking and divided (in the sense that coalitions are fragile and the 
political security of the ruling coalition is low). 
 One might expect the fragility of political coalitions to lead to a more diversified 
politics of international role taking as potential coalition partners compete for influence. 
Instead, more nearly the reverse has occurred in all three states, though for somewhat 
different reasons. In both Japan and South Korea, the left-right dynamics of 
international role taking have been subsumed by a left-right politics of national 
chauvinism. This politics of nationalism increasingly and dramatically interferes with 
the maintenance of good intra-alliance relations. In the United States, the same 
chauvinism is both intensified (in some regions) and tempered (in others) politically by 
the electoral role of immigrants. Although an early-twenty-first-century resurgence of 
US military and economic power prompted a return superficially to the game variant 
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the US played in the early Cold War, this game is now played in a very different 
political context, one that exhibits less of the bipartisan internationalism of the earlier 
period, greater political polarization in foreign policy (Gries 2014), and greater 
isolationism both among some elites and in public opinion. 
 
Table 1:  
Summary of International Role Taking in the US-Japan-South Korea Triad 




1950s Low External/Internal 
(Unified?) 
Client 
1970s Rising Internal (Unified) Weak Partner 





 1950s Low External Client 
1970s Low External/Internal 
(Unified?) 
Client 




1950s High Internal (Divided) Strong Hegemon 
1970s High (Declining) Internal (Unified?) Hegemon 
1990s High (Rising) Internal (Divided?) Strong Hegemon 
 
 Both Park Geun-hye in South Korea and Abe Shinzō in Japan have relied on a 
politics of assertive nationalism to secure their domestic political coalitions and to 
govern. For Park (the daughter of Park Chung-hee), this "politics of toughness" has 
brought South Korean and US policy toward North Korea back into alignment and 
improved their relations, but it has tended to work against improving relations with 
Japan (LaFranchi 2013). Instead, Park has made Japan's unrepentance a part of her 
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political agenda. In a trip to China in July 2013, she and Chinese President Xi Jinping 
agreed to the construction of a monument to Ahn Jung-guen, a Korean independence 
fighter who assassinated the Japanese governor of Korea (and former Prime Minister) 
Itō Hirobumi. And Park has found in Abe the perfect foil. As Takahara Akio has put it, 
"Abe is very rightwing by traditional measures. He is a historical revisionist at heart" 
(Takahara, quoted in Tisdall 2014). 
 Relations between South Korea and Japan have fluctuated, of course, depending 
on changes in leadership. No doubt, they will continue to do so. But the shifts in 
domestic political coalitions described in Table 1 suggest a secular trend, as well, 
toward more unpredictable and fraught relations among the United States, Japan, and 
South Korea, particularly among the latter two. This corresponds closely to the third 
hypothesis about domestic politics and external alliances (H3): that that inward-looking 
political coalitions reduce the likelihood of stable external alliances.9 
 
     ROK 
         –      + 
      – 
       CHN           USA 
   –       (?)        +     
     JPN 
 Figure 9: Signed Graph of Contemporary East Asian Strategic Triads 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 In a related finding, Sato and Hirata (2008) show that in contemporary Japan, when 
international and domestic norms conflict, it is the domestic norms that generally 
prevail. 
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 It is far too soon to write off the US-Japan-South Korea alliance. China has also 
engaged in a foreign policy that might be characterized as "assertive nationalism," and 
this works to reinforce the US|JPN|ROK triad. Moreover, our argument is not 
deterministic. Domestic politics now has the effect of creating uncertainty within this 
US-dominated triad, which we have also described as a "perturbation" effect. Hence, we 
may plausibly replace the plus sign (+) characterizing the Japan-ROK relationship in 




 As Organski (1958) observed, moments of role transition in international 
relations are notoriously dangerous. Rising powers are motivated to change 
international arrangements in accordance with their growing capabilities, and declining 
powers may seize the moment to fend off a challenger whose power can be expected to 
increase. Yet Organski's well-known discussion of such power transitions is only one 
example of how changes in international role relationships can have profound 
consequences. 
 To facilitate an understanding of these consequences, we undertake several tasks 
in this paper. First, we present a comprehensive typology in Figure 1 of Grand Strategy 
Orientations that define role relationships. The combination of Ego's and Alter's Grand 
Strategy Orientations, in turn, defines a game that characterizes their dyadic role 
enactment. All such games have equilibrium solutions in terms of Nash equilibria, 
Brams' nonmyopic equilibria, or both. Role taking among three or more players, on the 
other hand, is more complex and lacks determinate equilibrium solutions. 
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 For this reason, we adopt the alternative approach of perturbation analysis, 
arguing that domestic politics in particular may exert either a stabilizing or 
destabilizing force in such multi-body international systems. The Cold War US-China-
Soviet Union triad is an example of domestic stabilizing. Although the system tended 
toward instability, as each of these states sometimes curried favor with its rivals in an 
effort not to be left à soi-même, ideological and political differences between the US and 
the two communist states tended to stabilize the triad and reduce it to an East vs. West 
affair. 
 In contrast, relations among the United States, Japan, and South Korea have 
progressively become less stable as this triad has progressed through three historical 
phases. In the first phase (roughly, the 1950s and 1960s), both Japan and South Korea 
were tightly bound to the US, with little choice but to cooperate with each other as well. 
In the second phase (1970s and 1980s), Japan's economic rise and the relative decline of 
the US complicated their relations and produced tensions reflected in shifts of their 
mutual role definitions, particularly between Japan and the US. It was not until the 
third phase (post-1990), however, that more inward-looking domestic politics began to 
destabilize all three legs of the US|Japan|ROK triad and to call into question the basic 
role orientations of these states toward one another. For Japan and South Korea, in 
particular, the international relationship has become fraught. Undoubtedly, skillful 
leadership can find (and sometimes has found) a path toward more cooperative 
relations. What has changed, however, is that such skillful leadership is now a necessity 
rather than a luxury since domestic politics in all three countries increasingly rewards 
forthrightly self-serving foreign policies. The legacy of ill will between Japan and South 
Korea makes nationalist policies especially likely to undermine a stable alliance. 
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 The US|USSR|China triad thus reflects two hypothesized effects of domestic 
politics on international role taking within indeterminate, multi-body systems: (1) 
institutional and (2) ideological differences reduce uncertainty and constrain 
cooperative role taking within incompatible dyads. The US|Japan|ROK triad reflects a 
third hypothesized effect of domestic politics, that inward-looking political systems 
increase uncertainty and tend to destabilize (though not necessarily prohibit) 
cooperative role taking within potential dyadic alliances. 
 In advancing these arguments, we have ultimately followed a procedure that is 
closer to what Charles Sanders Pierce called abduction than either induction or 
deduction (Fann 1970; Lipton 2001). We have sought to deduce certain hypotheses 
about the impact of domestic politics on foreign policy role selection and enactment, but 
these hypotheses pertain to conditions of stability or instability in role taking. We 
regard these hypotheses as plausible, but we recognize that many other factors 
influence role selection. Conversely, we have also considered cases of role selection and 
enactment drawn from the behavior of major and minor powers in East Asia during the 
Cold War, paying special attention to role selection in three-body systems. But too few 
cases of this sort have been analyzed to permit confident inductive generalization. What 
we are left with is a plausible fit between the hypotheses and the cases. 
 Abduction takes the form of inference that a hypothesis is supported as an 
explanation for observed phenomena that would be remarkable were the hypothesis 
invalid but expected if the hypothesis is valid. To put this another way, consider the 
following statements (see Frankfurt 1958): 
The surprising fact, C, is observed. 
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course. 
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true.  
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We have argued that it would be remarkable for two alliance partners (Japan and South 
Korea) to have a falling out and experience serious challenges to their Grand Strategy 
Orientations toward each other just as a major challenger to both (China) is asserting 
newfound power and while both are already tightly bound in a triadic alliance with the 
United States. But we have also argued that a shift toward inward-looking political 
coalitions makes such alliances less stable or binding. And we have documented just 
such a shift, over three periods during the past 70 years, in the US|Japan|ROK triad. 
We believe that H3 is a plausible inference by abduction. 
 Much more could be done, of course, to explore the consequences of shifting 
Grand Strategy Orientations such as those identified here. In particular, we have not 
traced the effects of shifting equilibria in the games played by the US, Japan, and South 
Korea as they have enacted their gradually evolving roles toward one another. The 
stability of these games is, itself, likely to have an important influence on their behavior 
toward one another, and this may in turn have a recursive effect on their role 
definitions. This recursivity is one more reason that a purely deductive approach, even 
if it were available in three body systems, is unlikely to produce deterministic solutions. 
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Appendix I: 
Cold War Power Map of Strategic Dyads in East Asia 
 
 
(E\A)  USA= SOV> CHN> JPN> ROK= PRK 
USA   – – – – – 
SOV  –  + – – + 
CHN  – +  – – + 
JPN  + – –  – – 
ROK  + – – –  – 
PRK  – + + – – 
   
  Sources: Walker, Malici and Schafer (2011) for power map  
  and graph applications. See also Harary (1961, 1969).  
 
 
 The information in the above Cold War power map for the United States (USA), 
the Soviet Union (SOV), China (CHN), Japan (JPN), South Korea (ROK), and North 
Korea (PRK) includes their ordinal ranking for power defined as capabilities (<, =, >; see 
column headings) and their exercise of social power defined as positive (+) or negative 
(–) sanctions toward one another. For example, the United States as Ego (E) and Soviet 
Union as Alter (A) in the (E, A) dyad are equal (=) in power defined as capabilities, and 
each superpower exercises negative (–) sanctions toward one another: the valence of 
USA toward SOV is (–) in Row 1 Column 2 while the valence of SOV toward USA is 
also (–) in Row 2, Column 1. With this information it is possible to construct signed 
graphs of strategic triads in East Asia, e.g., the triads connecting China, Japan, the two 
Koreas, and the United States as shown in Figure 4 of this paper (Walker, Malici and 
Schafer 2011: 34-37; Harary 1961, 1969). The signs of the lines in a signed graph 
connecting members of a set of triads, e.g., {USA|JPN| ROK|CHN} in Figure 4 depend 
on the strategic game each dyad is playing with the other, which is constructed from the 
capabilities and sanctions information in Figure 1 (see also Walker, Malici, and Schafer 
2011: 257-266).  
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